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ABSTRACT
Corporate governance reform has taken center stage in Latin
America. Due to weak investor protection laws, Latin America has
suffered decreased liquidity in its securities markets and this poses a
troubling situation for these economies. The question is how can
Latin American countries, as civil law systems, effectively
incorporate shareholder protection rules in their legal systems. The
existing theories do not address the barrier the civil law imposes as a
majoritarian system on the development of minority shareholder
rights. For Latin America to effectively address improved minority
shareholder rights policies that promote broad stock ownership need
to be implemented in conjunction with corporate governance reform.
* David Orozco, New York University, Stem School of Business, B.S. Economics, 1999;
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Chile is offered as the proper model for this type of reform contrasted
with Mexico as an example of the status quo.
I. INTRODUCTION
Latin America is currently facing a credibility crisis among international
investors. Well-publicized scandals describing majority shareholder abuses
have caused international investors to slowly withdraw from Latin American
securities markets.' The Asian financial crisis of 1997, largely induced by poor
corporate governance and corruption, drew attention to the status of emerging
market corporate governance.' Corporate governance is defined as "the private
and public institutions, including laws, regulations and accepted business
practices, which together govern the relationship, in a market economy, between
corporate managers and entrepreneurs.., on one hand, and those who invest
resources in corporations, on the other."3 Well-developed capital markets are
engines for future economic growth.4 They are also an important source of
foreign exchange capital for Latin American economies. The destabilizing
effect of decreased portfolio investment has motivated Latin American countries
to reassess their corporate governance laws and improve minority shareholder
protection in particular.
Part II of this paper gives a background sketch of the situation. The main
argument of the paper is that civil law in Latin America establishes an obstacle
to the creation and adequate enforcement of minority shareholder laws. The
existing theories of corporate ownership structure do not take into account a
legal system's structural inability to recognize these rights in Latin America.
Recognition of the structural problem is necessary if a country decides to adjust
its corporate governance laws to reflect adequate shareholder protection. The
civil law operates on a majoritarian basis. Therefore, greater shareholder owner-
ship across society is a necessary condition for the civil law society to demon-
strate the political will necessary to create shareholder laws and adequately
enforce them.
To understand how minority shareholder rights relate to corporate gover-
nance and securities market development, it is useful to understand some theory.
Part III of this paper discusses the theories of corporate ownership and the
1. Mike Lubrano, Corporate Governance: An International and Mexican Perspective, 9 U.S.-
MEX. L.J. 117, 117-18 (2001).
2. Joseph J. Norton, Are Latin America and East Asia an Ocean Apart? The Connecting Currents
of Asian Financial Crises, 4 NATA: L. & BUS. REV. AM. 93, 100-06 (1998).
3. Charles P. Oman, Corporate Governance and National Development, at 13, ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION AND (OECD), DEV. CTR., Tech. Papers No. 180, CD/DOC-(2001)-12 (Nov. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.oecd.orgtdataoecd/I9/61/2432585.pdf (last visited July 17,2004) [hereinafter OECD].
4. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV.
559, 584 (1998).
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empirical support that gives the legal theory validity over the economic
efficiency and path dependence theories. Part IV expands the legal theory to
explain why a legal system's structural inability to develop corporate
governance norms needs to be included in the calculus that explains how law
shapes corporate governance. The argument is restated that a Latin American
civil law country needs to promote broad distribution of stock ownership across
society for minority shareholder rights to have a meaningful impact. Part V
addresses the forces leading to greater convergence of corporate governance
norms in Latin America. Part VI analyzes the development of minority
shareholder rights in Chile and Mexico. Part VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means introduced their theory of
corporations in The Modern Corporation and Private Property.5 The Berle-
Means model describes corporations owned by shareholders but controlled by
a board of directors and professional managers, both with small ownership
stakes in the company.6 The Berle-Means model attributes the separation of
corporate ownership and control to dispersed stock ownership! A comparative
study reveals most corporations (public and private) throughout the world do
not follow the Berle-Means model of dispersed ownership, i.e. most companies
have a majority shareholder usually comprised of a family group or the state.8
Three theories of corporate ownership structure are the efficiency, path
dependence and legal theories. The three theories are treated more extensively
below. Each theory has a unique perspective on another relevant and widely
discussed topic: to what extent are corporate governance norms like firm
ownership structure converging due to globalization. Empirical data supports
the legal theory. Adherents to the legal theory argue dispersed corporate owner-
ship is due to legal recognition and enforcement of minority shareholder rights.9
According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, adequate
protection of minority shareholder rights is an important aspect of corporate
governance:
Investors' confidence that the capital they provide will be protected
from misuse or misappropriation by corporate managers, board
5. Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around The World, at 2 (1998), at
http://post.economics.harvard.edulfacultylshleifer/papers/ownership.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
6. Id.
7. John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1999).
8. La Porta et al., supra note 5, at 5.
9. Id. at 28, 33.
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members or controlling shareholders is an important factor in the
capital markets. Corporate boards, managers and controlling share-
holders may have the opportunity to engage in activities that may
advance their own interests at the expense of non-controlling share-
holders. The Principles support equal treatment for foreign and
domestic shareholders in corporate governance.'"
Research shows common law countries like the United States offer greater
minority shareholder rights protection than civil law societies." Surprisingly,
there is often a lack of inquiry as to why the common law allows greater
minority shareholder protection than the civil law. Without examining this
question the legal theory cannot adequately explain how globalization will
impact Latin American law, which determines corporate governance norms like
firm ownership structure.
It is argued the common law is more flexible than the civil law and there-
fore more conducive to legal recognition of minority shareholder rights. 2 This
paper accepts this proposition but argues unless stock ownership is widely dis-
persed within a Latin American civil law society the lack of legislative will to
recognize shareholder rights prevents their formation and adequate enforce-
ment. ' Lack of widespread stock ownership in Latin America is an initial and
formidable constraint on:
a) Creation of minority shareholder rights;
b) An independent judiciary to enforce these laws;
c) Adequate market monitors that litigate majority shareholder
abuses; and
d) A portion of the local bar that advocates minority shareholder
rights.
The legal theory of corporate governance stresses law but recognizes that
economic efficiency and path dependence influence development of minority
shareholder rights. "4 However, the legal theory does not consider the nature of
a legal system's original inability to recognize the rights as a major constraining
10. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, at 40, OECD (2004), at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
11. La Porta et al., supra note 5, at 28.
12. Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, at 3, The World Bank
Group, World Bank Pol'y Research Working Paper No. 2904 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/20663_wps2904.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
13. Widespread ownership does not necessarily mean majority ownership. There may be
widespread ownership across society in the form of minority investments. The important aspect is that stock
ownership is distributed widely throughout society even if accomplished through minority ownership stakes.
14. Coffee, supra note 7, at 647.
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factor. This is where broad stock ownership is the crucial factor behind creation
and adequate enforcement of minority shareholder rights in Latin America.
As globalization marches on civil law countries must inevitably choose
whether to improve minority shareholder protection. A country may decide to
harmonize its minority shareholder rights with international standards. If that
is the case then policies that promote share ownership across society need to be
implemented for the rights to be codified and adequately upheld.
Why might a country want to improve its minority shareholder laws? The
legal theory argues dispersed corporate ownership is due to legal recognition
and enforcement of minority shareholder rights. 5 Dispersed corporate owner-
ship provides liquid capital markets and companies with higher market valua-
tions. 6 Development of securities markets is correlated with future economic
growth.' 7 So countries may want dispersed corporate ownership to develop
better capital markets which create future economic growth. Also, international
investors are increasingly reluctant to invest in countries with poor minority
shareholder protection due to well-publicized abuses committed by majority
shareholders.' 8 This last reason is partially behind the drastic decrease in
liquidity of many Latin American securities markets.' 9 Thin securities markets
means less foreign investment, an important capital source for emerging market
economies. Institutional investors have joined the voices expressing concern
over poor minority shareholder protection in Latin America. 20  Also, inter-
national organizations like the OECD advocate improvement of minority share-
holder protection to increase foreign and domestic investment, which results in
economic prosperity that benefits all classes of citizens. 2' The OECD argues
better corporate governance leads to a more equitable economic environment
for all social classes thus making a social as well as economic argument in favor
of improved corporate governance.
If leaders of a Latin American country want to improve their securities
markets to promote future economic growth, how can they overcome the barrier
the civil law structurally imposes against development of minority shareholder
rights? The major impediment against creation and adequate enforcement of
minority shareholder rights in a civil law society is lack of broad stock
ownership among society. Complementary legal reforms that encourage
15. La Porta et al., supra note 5, at 33.
16. Coffee, supra note 7, at 648-49.
17. Raghram, supra note 4.
18. See generally Andrea Mandel-Campbell, Mexican Entrepreneur in Peace Offering to Minorities
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at 38.
19. Lubrano, supra note 1.
20. Manuel R. Agosin & Ernesto Past6n, Corporate Governance in Chile, at 12, OECD (Mar. 27,
2001), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2443457.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
21. OECD, supra note 10, at 7.
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increased stock ownership among society are necessary. The examples of Chile
and Mexico will be presented to show differing approaches towards minority
shareholder protection in Latin America.
Chile enacted reforms that increased share ownership across society
through its privatization of pension fund administrators."2 Chilean society's
increased stake in corporate governance matters helped propel legal reforms that
harmonized Chilean corporate governance laws with international standards.2 3
Private pension fund administrators developed into powerful market monitors
with the economic incentives to check abuses committed by majority share-
holders.24 Enforcement institutions in Chile asserted independence through
application of fairness based shareholder laws.25 A portion of the Chilean bar
will develop to litigate lawsuits initiated by minority shareholders. This last
change will have repercussions within Chile's legal profession as relational
networks become less valuable and meritocratic and the rule of law becomes
increasingly important.
Mexico has not modified its pension system to increase stock ownership
or enacted regulations to achieve this goal.26 Consequently, securities
ownership is not widely distributed across society. Predictably, the legislature
has not been pressured by constituents to implement meaningful corporate
governance reform and its existing laws in this area are outdated compared to
international standards. In contrast to Chile, despite reported cases of majority
shareholder abuses, the Mexican legislature does not feel compelled to reform
corporate governance law. Mexico adopts the stance the market ought to
discriminate against companies that do not adhere to adequate corporate
27governance norms. Adequate market monitors have failed to develop as a
result of continued concentrated ownership structures. Liquidity of the Mexican
securities market has languished as foreign investors demand greater minority
shareholder protection before investing.28 The Mexican judiciary and regulatory
institutions cannot assert independence without fairness-based laws. Finally, the
Mexican bar cannot move away from the insider relational networks that
characterize the legal profession in Mexico and Latin America in general.
22. Agosin, supra note 20, at 4.
23. Mike Lubrano, The Legal and Regulatory Framework - A Comparative Overview, at 5, OECD
(Apr. 27, 2000), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/26/192189l .pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
24. Agosin, supra note 20, at 16-17.
25. Ricardo Escobar, Corporate Governance in Chile: New Developments, at 6, OECD (Mar. 2001),
at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/3/49/1823372.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
26. See generally BARBARA E. KRITZER, SOCIALSECURITY PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 3' -32
(Soc. Sec. Bulletin Vol. 63 No. 2, 2000).
27. Antje Zaldivar Mueller, Corporate Governance Assessment: Mexico, 9 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 137, 151
(2001).
28. Lubrano, supra note 1, at 119.
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I. THEORIES OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
The Berle-Means model of corporations owned by dispersed passive
shareholders and controlled by professional managers is limited to a few rich
common law countries, the United States among them.29 Companies in Latin
America typically exhibit concentrated ownership, i.e., ownership dominated
by a majority shareholder. Researchers have sought to explain why few
countries follow the Berle-Means model. The following theories have been
advanced.
A. The Efficiency Theory
The efficiency theory views corporate ownership structure and corporate
governance in general as a function of economic efficiency.30 Put another way,
companies adopt corporate governance norms that are economically efficient.
The economic advantages of dispersed ownership are empirically demonstrated.
Dispersed corporate ownership encourages liquid capital markets and results in
companies with high market values.3  However, it is inconclusive whether
dispersed ownership is better than concentrated ownership. Concentrated
corporate ownership offers better direct monitoring of management and greater
investment in long-term projects. What is considered the most efficient
ownership model may also depend on the economic context. At one time, when
the United States economy was less robust than Japan's, the Japanese corporate
governance model was considered superior but since the Japanese economy has
contracted, attention has focused on the American model.33 Since the United
States' economy has slowed, arguments favoring United States style corporate
governance have less force. Also, recent high profile cases of corporate abuse
such as Worldcom, Tyco and Enron weaken the argument that American
corporate governance is the best model.
Different countries express different values. In Germany, the idea of
codetermination permeates the corporate culture. 34 Through codetermination,
employees by statute have substantial representation among the board of
29. La Porta et al., supra note 5, at 34.
30. See generally Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L
& ECON. 375 (1983); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 212-18 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
31. Coffee, supra note 7, at 649.
32. Id. at 648.
33. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 331 (2001).
34. Helmut Kohl, Corporate Governance: Path Dependence and German Corporate Law: Some
Skeptical Remarks from the Sideline, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 189, 194-95 (1999).
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directors. 5 This notion is anathema to the American view directors possess the
bulk of corporate control as representatives of shareholders, the ultimate owners
of the firm. Codetermination is an example of how a different culture weighs
values differently with respect to corporate governance issues. Economic
efficiency cannot adequately explain this phenomenon and does not factor into
its analysis these important cultural norm differences.
The economic efficiency theory does not explain why common law
countries tend to have better minority shareholder protection than civil law
countries. If economic efficiency is the principal force behind corporate
ownership then relative differences in economic efficiency among countries
would dictate the degree of concentration of corporate ownership.
Though economic efficiency is not the sole factor that determines corporate
structure, it plays an important role within the context of globalization.
Countries that want to increase foreign investment, unlock higher domestic
company valuations, and develop efficient securities markets as an engine for
future economic growth, may prioritize economic efficiency and adjust
domestic corporate governance laws to reflect this judgment. This is what
happened in Chile as regulators placed heavy emphasis on the economic
benefits of improved minority shareholder protection. Alternatively, a country
may decide the corporate governance framework ought to adjust by itself and
allow companies to voluntarily adopt corporate governance reform. This is
currently the stance adopted by Mexico. In September 1999 Mexico's
Securities and Exchange Commission equivalent, the Cdmara Nacional de Bolsa
y Valores (C.N.B.V.) promulgated a non-binding corporate governance
practices code.36
It is possible government leaders in cases like Mexico believe their existing
corporate governance norms reflect values that are more important than pure
efficiency concerns, e.g., concentrated ownership promotes investment in long-
term development of employee human capital.37 Dispersed ownership facilitates
changes in corporate control through takeovers and may subordinate employee
interests in the process. Dispersed corporate ownership with its complementary
well-developed capital markets has created companies with short-term vision
that seek to maximize short-term profits. 8 Or, it may be entrenched economic
interests prevent the government from instituting needed corporate governance
reforms. These examples illustrate economic efficiency cannot by itself explain
or predict a country's corporate ownership structure.
35. Friedrich Kubler, Corporate Governance: Comment: On Mark Roe, German Codetermination
and German Securities Market, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 215-16 (1999).
36. Mueller, supra note 27, at 150.
37. Coffee, supra note 7, at 649.
38. Id. at 643.
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B. Path Dependence
Adherents of path dependence believe corporate structure is principally
influenced by politics and history.39 Path dependence is the idea that "[ilnitial
conditions, determined by the accident of history or the design of politics, can
set an economy down a particular path. ' ° An example of path dependence in
America is the theory that populist distrust of large financial intermediaries
prompted laws that prevent these groups from amassing control of enterprises.4
Another example of what might be argued is path dependence is Japan with its
lifetime employment as a result of post WWII policies.42
In response to the legal theory, path dependence proponents argue law is
dominated by politics and history, and adequate minority shareholder protection
laws result from political policies that create a demand for these rights.43 But
even this argument does not eliminate the doubt cast on path dependence by the
legal theory. The legal theory demonstrates there is a high correlation between
minority shareholder rights protection and dispersed corporate ownership. If the
path dependence theory is correct, all countries with similar corporate
ownership models have similar political-historical forces shaping corporate
ownership. That hypothesis would have us believe countries with mostly
concentrated ownership like South Korea, Norway, Mexico and Greece share
historical-political similarities that resulted in concentrated ownership.
The legal theory demonstrates common law countries tend to have better
protection of minority shareholder rights than civil law countries. Path
dependence, like the other theories, does not take into account the initial
structural hurdle the civil law imposes on the development of minority
shareholder rights, i.e., the civil law prevents formation of a political lobby that
demands the rights and this is contingent upon broad stock ownership. Also,
due to increased competition from globalization, many countries have begun
adopting minority shareholder protection laws and this contravenes the idea
corporate governance is mainly a function of history and politics.' Law matters
but economic efficiency may trump path dependence as seen in countries like
Chile.
Like economic efficiency, path dependence cannot by itself explain or
predict a country's corporate ownership structure. However, like economic
efficiency, path dependence is an important factor that may influence whether
39. Id. at 646.
40. Gilson, supra note 33, at 334.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 334-35.
44. Coffee, supra note 7, at 667.
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a country adopts minority shareholder rights. An illustrative example of this is
Japan. Post WWII Japan was heavily influenced by America. In 1950 due to
strong political pressure from the United States, Japan enacted minority
shareholder rights legislation.45 This is an example of Japan, a civil law
country, circumventing the hurdle initially presented by its legal system through
politics and history to provide greater shareholder protection.
C. The Legal Theory
Proponents of the legal theory believe dispersed corporate ownership
results from adequate legal protection of minority shareholder rights.46 A study
compared ownership structures of large and medium sized corporations in 27
countries and found that "except in economies with very good shareholder
protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle-
Means model of the modem corporation. Rather, these firms are typically
controlled by families or the State. 47 Adequate legal protection of minority
shareholder rights allows controlling shareholders to reduce their ownership to
48
a minority interest. Without adequate legal protection a shareholder will
amass a controlling stake to compensate for this lack of protection and minority
shareholders invest because they are induced to buy at sharply discounted prices
that reflect their inadequate legal protection.49  The study also found a
significant correlation among common law countries and adequate minority
shareholder protection. The legal theory of corporate ownership structure has
been described as an intermediate position between the opposing path
dependence and economic efficiency theories. 50 Put another way, empirically
it has been demonstrated law matters but economic efficiency and path
dependence also influence corporate governance norms.
IV. THE LEGAL THEORY EXPANDED
The legal theory demonstrates minority shareholder protection is an
important determinant of corporate ownership structure. Adequate minority
shareholder protection leads to dispersed corporate ownership; inadequate
minority shareholder protection leads to concentrated ownership. Common law
countries afford better minority shareholder protection but this begs the question
why?
45. Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Law Symposium: Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and
Corporate Governance: Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 653 (2001).
46. La Porta et al., supra note 5, at 35.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id.
49. Coffee, supra note 7, at 644.
50. Id. at 647.
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Research shows when compared to the civil law, the common law is better
adapted to respond to evolving economic conditions.51 In civil law countries,
judges play a mechanical role and because of this, the law may not suitably
adapt to rapidly changing economic situations.52 Also, in the civil law codes are
enacted on a majoritarian basis by the legislature. For minority shareholder
rights to pass the legislature a base of shareholders large enough to elicit
attention from the lawmaking body needs to exist a priori. Broad stock
ownership among society is necessary for this reform to coalesce. Thus, due to
the inflexibility to craft law that suits evolving economic needs and the a priori
requirement of broad stock ownership the civil law acts as an initial constraint
on the development of minority shareholder rights.
The majoritarian nature of the civil law requires politics to play a central
role in shaping minority shareholder rights. It is incorrect, however, to conclude
that because politics plays an important role in the development of minority
shareholder rights this proves the validity of path dependence over all other
theories. Instead, it should be recognized that due to the majoritarian nature of
the civil law politics is necessary in this system to a greater degree than the
common law. As the legal theory predicts, without minority shareholder rights
developed through the mechanics of the civil law, liquid capital markets and
dispersed ownership will flounder. The legal theory allows path dependence
and economic efficiency to influence the outcome and this is an example where
all three theories converge to influence the result.
The government of a civil law country may act as trustee of the public
good and enact minority shareholder rights without broad stock ownership.
However, without broad stock ownership there will be less legislative and
institutional commitment to ensure enforcement of minority shareholder laws
and an absence of market monitors. If a country improves its corporate
governance code to reflect higher international fairness standards without
increasing stock ownership the result will be formal adoption of laws largely
devoid of substance. Without broad stock ownership the civil law framework
will not recognize minority shareholder laws as a proper complement to other
existing laws.53 Formal adoption of minority shareholder laws without broad
stock ownership would prevent development of essential elements to support the
laws: political will, an independent judiciary, market monitors, and a portion
of the bar that litigates majority shareholder abuses.
One might ask if broad stock ownership is conducive to minority
shareholder reform why did Russia fare so badly? Russia went through a wave
51. Beck et al., supra note 12.
52. Id.
53. See Coffee supra note 7, at 659.
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of "mass privatization" in 1992-1994.54 As part of its privatization program
Russia engaged in a mass voucher privatization program.55 The Russian
government gave citizens vouchers that could be exchanged for shares in
companies that were being privatized.56 However, most of the shares in these
companies were awarded to managers and employees and on average twenty
percent of a company was transferred to citizens.57
Managers were intent on extracting as much gain from the company for
personal use as possible and quickly purchased vouchers using illegally
obtained funds to do so.5' As majority shareholders, managers engaged in
operations to extract company wealth to the detriment of minority
shareholders.59 Minority shareholder reform did not follow broad stock
ownership because managers exploited rampant government corruption and
Russia's inexperience with corporate law.6° Due to extensive corruption, the
government was not prepared to protect the interests of minority shareholders.
Minority investors in Latin America are exposed to corruption and majority
shareholders who have the opportunity to extract wealth from companies.
However, unlike Russia, Latin America did not emerge from communism to a
shock treatment of capitalism. Majority shareholders in Latin America had to
establish a good reputation among minority shareholders to induce them to
remain investors.61 This may seem like an argument in favor of the status quo
in Latin America. However, because Latin American securities markets are
languishing, many governments in the region are aware the time is ripe for
corporate governance reform.
V. WHY IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONVERGING?
The Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) is an international
initiative launched by the OECD and World Bank in collaboration with
regulators and private sector leaders to help developing countries improve
corporate governance. 62 According to the GCGF:
54. Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1739 (2000).
55. Id. at 1740.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Black et al., supra note 54, at 1734-35.
60. Id. at 1741-42.
61. Id.
62. Corporate Governance: An Issue of International Concern, at 2, GLOBAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FORUM (GCGF), at http://www.gcgf.org/ABOUT.HTM (last visited July 17, 2004) [hereinafter
GCGF1.
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Corporate governance was lent new urgency by the global financial
crises, which unleashed unprecedented volatility in markets, led to
devaluation, default and capital flight, with the brunt borne by the
poor. Reform on governance can no longer be viewed as a national
or local issue for any corporation: globalization has brought in its
wake the need for international coordination of effort to ensure that
growth is sustained and shared: sustained in that it is robust and can
withstand shocks-and shared in that it brings prosperity to the many,
rather than the few. Good governance is a source of competitive
advantage and critical to economic and social progress. In an
increasingly globalized economy, firms need to tap domestic and
international capital markets for investment. But capital providers
have a choice-and the quality of corporate governance is
increasingly becoming a criterion for investment and lending.
Expanding and deepening the capital pool for developing and
transition economies requires full attention to corporate governance
standards. This sets the imperative for reform.63
One reason Latin American countries want to improve minority
shareholder protection is dispersed corporate ownership leads to developed
capital markets and companies with high market capitalizations. 6' A developed
securities market is correlated with future economic growth.65 A country with
concentrated corporate ownership may want to adopt minority shareholder
rights to increase dispersed ownership and reap the benefits of developed capital
markets. One of the stated goals of Chile's updated corporate governance laws
was to provide "incentives for the dispersal of corporate ownership, thus
encouraging current controllers to maintain control at lower levels of ownership
concentration .. .."6' Companies with concentrated ownership may be
benefited by a change in corporate ownership structure. Companies in
developed securities markets have higher company valuations that facilitate
global-scale acquisitions through higher stock prices.67
The decreasing liquidity of Latin American securities markets is a serious
problem for these countries."M Thinning trading volume is attributed to many
factors like migration to foreign securities markets, reduced foreign investment,
less initial public offerings, acquisitions by foreign firms, and de-listings due to
63. Id.
64. Coffee, supra note 7, at 659.
65. Rajan, supra note 4, at 584.
66. Jorge Bustos Oyanedel, Tender Offers: The Chilean Case, at 5, OECD (Apr. 2000), at
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdI49/37/1930036.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004).
67. Coffee, supra note 7, at 647.
68. Lubrano, supra note 1.
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growing private transactions. 69 An important factor behind the reduced
portfolio investment is weak minority shareholder protection.7° Latin American
countries have taken note of the decreased trading volumes and recognize the
need to address investors' concerns regarding improved shareholder
protection.71
Institutional investors advocate improved corporate governance in Latin
America. 72 The GCGF has a Private Sector Advisory Group (PSAG) that brings
international private sector leaders to assist developing countries improve
corporate governance.73 To achieve its goals the PSAG established an Investor
Responsibility Task Force that includes the world's largest institutional
investors.74 Together these investors manage $3 trillion USD in assets.75 One
study conducted a survey of over 200 institutional investors who manage nearly
$3.25 trillion USD in assets. Seventy five percent of these investors consider
corporate governance to be at least as important as financial performance when
they consider whether to invest in a company.
76
International organizations like the OECD -urge countries to improve
corporate governance. According to the OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance (Principles), adequate protection of minority shareholder rights is
an important aspect of corporate governance. The OECD Principles "represent
a common basis that OECD Member countries consider essential for the
development of good governance practice. Section II of the Principles: The
Equitable Treatment of Shareholders states "[t]he corporate governance
framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including
minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 78 Section
II of the Principles lists the following as necessary elements for equitable
treatment of shareholders: "All shareholders of the same class should be treated
equally ... [i]nsider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited...
[m]embers of the board and managers should be required to disclose any
material interests in transactions or matters affecting the corporation.
69. id.
70. Id. at 119.
71. Id. at 123.
72. Agosin, supra note 20, at 12.
73. Private Sector Advisory Group, at 1, GCGF, at http://www.gcgf.org/partners/psag.htm (last
visited July 17, 2004) [hereinafter PSAG].
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2.
76. MCKINSEY & CO., INVESTOR OPINION SURVEY ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 1, GCGF
(2000), at http://www.gcgf.org/docs/72CGBrochure.PDF (last visited July 17, 2004).
77. OECD, supra note 10, at 11.
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id.
Orozco
VI. THE STATUS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT IN
CHILE AND MEXICO
A. Chile
Chile is presented as the case of strong convergence. In 1981, Chile
reformed its pension system and allowed private firms called AFP's to
administer pensions and invest in Chilean securities.8" Under the new rules, all
Chilean workers are obligated to contribute ten percent of their monthly
incomes to the AFP, which invest in Chilean securities and AFP's now manage
funds worth almost fifty percent of the country's GDP.8
Increased securities ownership across Chilean society helped create a
political lobby that demanded improved minority shareholder protection after
cases of majority shareholder abuse that "engendered shareholder rebellion,
public outcry and eventually legislative responses." 82 In 1981, Chile revamped
its corporate law and in 2000, a new law on tender offers and corporate
governance was passed (OPA Law).83 The OPA Law is a bold attempt to bring
Chilean corporate governance to international standards and "improve fairness,
transparency and order in the Chilean Capital Market as a whole." 8
The OPA Law harmonizes Chilean corporate governance with OECD
Principles, since the law requires equal treatment of shareholders in tender
offers, incorporates stricter rules regarding use of confidential information, and
forbids related transactions unless they have been approved by the board of
directors and are consistent with standards of fairness.85 Significantly, the OPA
Law allows minority shareholders who own five percent of shares to bring a
derivative suit against corporate insiders for violating Chilean Corporations
Law, regulations or company bylaws.86 A derivative suit allows a shareholder
to sue individual corporate insiders on behalf of the corporation.87 The OPA
Law also stipulates litigation costs are paid by the defendant if the suit succeeds;
otherwise, plaintiff bears the cost. 88  This policy encourages meritorious
80. Agosin, supra note 20, at 2.
81. Id. at4.
82. Lubrano, supra note 23, at 5.
83. Jose W. Fernandez, Corporate Caveat Emptor: Minority Shareholder Rights in Mexico, Chile,
Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 157, 174 (2001).
84. Escobar, supra note 25, at 2.
85. Id. at 6-12.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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lawsuits. To date Chile is the only Latin American country to introduce the
concept of shareholder derivative suits.
89
The creation of AFP's (private pension fund managers) is an important
reason for the comparatively good development of the Chilean securities
markets.90 As minority shareholders, AFP's are powerful monitors of abuses
committed by majority shareholders.9 A high profile example of litigation
initiated by AFP's as minority shareholders is the Chispas case.92
The Chispas case arose when the Spanish acquirers of Enersis, Chile's
largest electric utility holding company, bestowed inordinate benefits on
Enersis' majority shareholder, a Chilean company called Chispas.93 During the
acquisition, the Spanish acquirer offered Chispas 840 times the price paid to
minority shareholders, AFP's among them.94 The AFP's sued in court to pre-
vent the acquisition from occurring and succeeded to void the tender offer under
minority shareholder laws.95
Chile's legal profession, as most of the Latin American legal profession is
an insider system heavily reliant on relational networks.' As part of a study,
a person within the Mexican legal profession recognized the importance of
relational networks for a young Mexican attorney:
I believe that human relations are always important in every sense.
They are necessary because the young lawyer who is starting profes-
sional practice and has no social relations that can provide him or her
with a case will have no work and will end up in small-time jobs,
perhaps as the last secretary of a tribunal, or checking papers in a
public office, and that's where he or she will remain ......
Another trait of the Latin American legal profession attributed to insider
networks is weakness of the judiciary.9" One study found that "[t]he major
89. Fernandez, supra note 83, at 180.
90. Agosin, supra note 20, at 4.
91. Id. at 14-17.
92. Id. at 16-17.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 17.
95. Agosin, supra note 20, at 18.
96. Larissa Adler Lomnitz & Rodrigo Salazar, Cultural Elements in the Practice of Law in Mexico:
Informal Networks in a Formal System, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND
IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY 210 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., Univ. of Mich. Press
2002).
97. Id. at 233.
98. YVES DEZALAY & BRIANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (THE CHICAGO SERIES
IN LAW AND SOCIETY) 225 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).
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structural weakness of the courts, as just described, was their dependency. They
have historically been linked to extended families in Brazil and Chile and to the
long-dominant political party in Mexico. ' 99
The legal profession in Chile will improve with the introduction of laws
that level the playing field for minority shareholders. The derivative suit and
provision awarding legal fees to the plaintiff if successful encourage plaintiffs'
suits against powerful corporate insiders. The majority shareholders challenged
in Chilean courts represent some of the most powerful interests in Latin
America. It bodes well the legal profession in Chile has a framework for hold-
ing powerful economic groups accountable and has had success doing so. Hold-
ing majority shareholders accountable is an important step to improve corporate
governance and signals a shift towards the rule of law."°
It is important the Chilean OPA Law has as a goal to "improve fairness."' '
Better minority shareholder protection is ultimately concerned with fairness to
all shareholders. The enforcement of fairness-based rules will impact Chile's
legal profession. According to one commentator Chile's Superintendence of
Securities and Insurance (SVS) has a prominent role as enforcer of the OPA
Law: "SVS plays a strong and active role to assure the strict observance of the
new rules .... ,1 02 Independent government institutions like the SVS that apply
the law and effective monitors like AFP's that litigate wrongs committed by
powerful groups will increasingly interact to promote the rule of law over
cronyism in Chile. A legal profession supported by independent institutions and
adequate laws that punish abuses by powerful interests relies less on insider
networks since the networks seek to protect entrenched interests. The ability to
obtain legal redress from the most powerful interests in society implies reliance
on the rule of law.0 3
A legal system based on the rule of law values meritocracy and advocacy
over personal networks. One can envision a portion of the Chilean bar that
focuses on minority shareholder cases. This portion of the bar would be less
inclined to develop relational capital as its top priority. Instead, it would rely
on skill as long as adequate laws and independent institutions are in place. This
entrepreneurial segment of the bar would value talent over personal relations
and a legal meritocracy would emerge within this portion of the bar.
Chile has previously spearheaded free market reforms later imitated
throughout Latin America."'O Broad stock ownership, market monitors, fairness
99. Id.
100. See Lomnitz & Salazar, supra note 96, at 211.
101. Escobar, supra note 25, at 2.
102. Id. at 6.
103. See Lomnitz & Salazar, supra note 96, at 211.
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Apr. 2, 2001, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01 14/b3726145.htm (last visited
July 17, 2004).
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based laws, an independent judiciary, and entrepreneurial meritocratic bar are
crucial elements in Chile's move to update its corporate governance. Improved
corporate governance may help the Latin American legal profession move away
from insider relational networks to greater reliance on the rule of law. This can
only reinforce the credibility of Latin America's commitment to minority share-
holder rights and more equitable and transparent corporate governance in
general.
B. Mexico
Mexico is presented as the case of weak convergence. In 1997 Mexico
reformed its pension system, however it limited investment to government
bonds. 0 5 As a result, widespread stock ownership has not occurred in Mexico.
In September 1999 Mexico's Securities and Exchange Commission equivalent,
the Cdmara Nacional de Bolsa y Valores (CNBV) promulgated a non-binding
corporate governance practices code.' °6 The code strengthens minority share-
holder protection and recommends formation of special committees of the board
of directors. 10 7 Mexican law makes it mandatory for public companies to dis-
close their "level of adherence to the practices recommended by the Code."'
0 8
This approach leaves the market to dictate the results, punishing companies that
adhere least to the code."°
Mexican law hinders litigation of majority shareholder abuses. An
example of inadequate minority shareholder protection is Mexico's General
Law of Commercial Companies (LGSM) Article 201:
[A]ny judicial challenge to corporate resolutions must be presented
by the owners of at least one-third of the capital stock of the corpora-
tion, none of which may have voted in favor of the resolution in
question. Owners of at least one-third of the capital stock may also
bring an action on behalf of the corporation against its directors.'
Article 201 is not favorable to minority shareholders because its one-third
ownership requirement is restrictively high. It has the potential to become a
very useful law if the ownership threshold is lowered. Under the Chilean OPA
Law a derivative suit may be brought by a shareholder who owns five percent
of the stock, a level institutional investors can feasibly obtain. Article 201
allows what may resemble a derivative suit but the one-third ownership
105. Kritzer, supra note 26.
106. Mueller, supra note 27, at 150.
107. Id. at 151.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Fernandez, supra note 83, at 168.
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requirement is so onerous it makes the law largely useless. One commentator
observed that in Mexico:
shareholder rights and more specifically, the rights of minorities are
very limited. There are no remedies in equity and Mexican courts
have taken the position of enforcing form over substance. Litigation
in Mexico is of limited value, and usually requires substantial
expense. Cases are not reported, and the few decisions that are, reach
the federal circuit courts and occasionally, the Supreme Court, where
the particular facts are not reported, but simply a paragraph
containing the principle upheld is published."'
Is path dependence stronger in Mexico than in Chile? Path dependence
proponents would claim Mexican political and historical forces trumped
efficiency concerns. This may be true only to an extent because legal reform is
not the only path towards convergence. Convergence may occur through
indirect means, e.g., some large foreign corporations have migrated to United
States' exchanges and subjected themselves to higher corporate governance
standards." 2 Also, many Mexican companies have been acquired by foreign
companies, which adhere to stricter corporate governance rules." 3 However, the
possibility exists that entrenched economic interests lobbied the Mexican
government to refrain from instituting corporate governance reform that would
benefit the economy as a whole. It is also possible Mexican regulators are
unaware of the constraints the civil law places on the development of minority
shareholder protection. If so, regulators are unaware reforms to disperse stock
ownership are needed to develop and adequately enforce minority shareholder
rights.
The absence of adequate minority shareholder reform in Mexico has
resulted in status quo, e.g., a legal profession incapable of litigating abuses
committed by majority shareholders. An example of unchecked majority abuse
occurred in 1999. Ricardo Salinas Pliego is head of one of Mexico's largest
industrial groups that includes Elektra, a large retailer, and TV Azteca, a broad-
casting company.1 4 In 1999, Salinas sold half of his privately owned telephone
111. Mueller, supra note 27, at 143.
112. Coffee, supra note 7, at 650.
113. See Carlos Morales & lleana Fernandez, "Telecom is King," Latin American M &A Hits Record
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Stanley Dean Witter-Overall Top Financial Adviser, at 3, THOMSON FIN., Sec. Data, Latin American Research
Group (2000), at http://www.tfsd.com/league/pdfs/4Q2000/LatAm2000FinalPress Release.PDF (last visited
July 17, 2004).
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company, Unefon, to TV Azteca after he was unable to obtain financing for a
Unefon venture." 5
TV Azteca' s minority shareholders were angered since they were reluctant
to assume ownership of an upstart telephone company." 6 Under more equitable
laws, minority shareholders would have litigated Mr. Salinas' actions as an
abuse of power or breach of loyalty to the corporation. Mr. Salinas saw the
publicly traded stocks he controls plummet in value as investors foresaw future
abuses." 7 Salinas sought to make peace with minority shareholders by reform-
ing the corporate boards of Elektra and TV Azteca." 8 However, the harm was
done and nothing in the existing Mexican regulatory framework can prevent
another such abuse of power.
Under the existing environment, the Mexican legal profession will retain
the image and characteristics of an insider network. As long as the Mexican
legal profession is unable to place checks on powerful interests within society
the legal profession will serve the needs of those whose power remains un-
checked. If powerful interests are held unaccountable, the legal profession has
little incentive to move away from a model of insider networks.
Adequate minority shareholder protection requires independent institutions
to enforce the law objectively. Without broader stock ownership in a civil law
society there will be inadequate legislative will to create minority shareholder
laws and inadequate will to maintain the independent institutions that enforce
these laws. Under the status quo, the lack of independent institutions may be
viewed as a major problem in the Mexican and Latin American legal profession.
Mexico and other Latin American countries may be slow to follow Chile's
lead due to path dependence or lack of awareness that the civil law creates a
constraint on the development of minority shareholder laws. However, if
Chile's corporate governance reform creates a more transparent legal system
that attracts investment, Mexico and other Latin American countries will be
inclined to follow Chile's lead to retain a competitive advantage. Globalization
requires countries to maintain competitive advantages and law can help them
achieve this goal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Globalization creates the need for corporate governance reform, parti-
cularly the improvement of minority shareholder rights. Corporate governance
reform is intended to improve the local economy and securities markets.
Globalization accelerates the need for reform as developing countries seek
115. Id.
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117. Id.
118 Id.
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foreign investment and update their corporate governance codes to reflect
international standards like the OECD Principles. Latin American securities
markets have been languishing in part because the region has been slow to
improve corporate governance." 9
The situation is complicated since countries in Latin America follow the
civil law tradition. Due to its inability to respond to economic changes and its
majoritarian nature, the civil law is a formidable obstacle for minority share-
holder rights development. None of the existing theories of corporate structure
address this issue. Without broad stock ownership, the civil law is poorly
equipped structurally to address corporate governance reforms. Broad stock
ownership solidifies the legislative will to create minority shareholder laws and
through fairness-based laws helps the judiciary assert independence as it
enforces these laws. Broad stock ownership also gives rise to monitors that liti-
gate abuses committed by majority shareholders. With the appropriate laws and
institutions in place, the Latin American legal profession can move away from
its traditional insider network structure to one that is more reliant on information
and meritocracy.
Chile implemented reforms that increased stock ownership among society
and this created the political will to develop adequate minority shareholder pro-
tection laws. Applying fairness-based laws helped the judiciary assert its
independence. The fairness component of the Chilean OPA Law and indepen-
dent regulatory institutions will help reduce cronyism in Chile.
Globalization has drawn attention to corporate governance and particularly
minority shareholder rights in Latin America. For example, OECD's Latin
American Corporate Governance Roundtable,
aims to facilitate public and private sector policy-dialogue. It pro-
vides a forum for the exchange of experiences between senior policy-
makers, regulators and market participants with first hand experience
of present developments and ongoing work. Building on its
discussions, the Roundtable will issue a Latin American Corporate
Governance White Paper. The White Paper will target the most
urgent areas for improvement, propose effective ways to respond to
existing shortcomings and discuss the appropriate division of respon-
sibilities among different groupings. The conclusions made in the
White Paper will serve as a practical reform agenda and also form
valuable input to any future review of the OECD Principles of Cor-
porate Governance. Participants to the Roundtable come from
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, France,
119. Lubrana, supra note I, at 119-20.
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Hungary, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the
United States and Venezuela.12 0
Fairness based laws, independent institutions and a competent bar that
litigates abuses committed by majority shareholders help foster the rule of law.
If Chile's improved corporate governance code encourages economic pros-
perity, :other Latin American nations will look towards Chile as a model for
updating their own corporate governance codes. However, it should be stressed
Chile's success is in large part due to broader stock ownership. This is the
missing factor the literature has not focused on and explains why the civil law
so often fails to provide adequate minority shareholder protection.
120. The Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable, at 1, OECD, at
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